For charity: one of Heidegger’s better books is the four-volume set on Nietzsche. It is told that when it was originally published by Klostermann, with “heidegger” and “nietzsche” written in lower-case letters in an obscure arrangement, it was difficult for the German reader to tell whether it was a book by Heidegger on Nietzsche or a book by Nietzsche on Heidegger; whatever, but Heidegger’s real strengths were in the history of philosophy and he is actually systematically critical of the Wille zur Macht, which somebody forgot to tell him was not a systematic work amenable to penetrating analysis.
The point on which I most fully agree with Heidegger’s analysis is his assessment of Nietzsche’s — and the rest of the Victorian world’s — focus on “values” as nihilistic:
Even in our first elucidation of nihilism, we took our impetus from the fact that the name and concept nihilism intends thought about Being, although Nietzsche consistently understands nihilism in terms of valuative thought. Although the question about the being as such and as a whole was and is the guiding question of all metaphysics, thinking about values came to predominate decisively in metaphysics only recently, and did so only through Nietzsche, in such a way that metaphysics henceforth took a decisive turn toward the fulfillment of its essence.
Partly as a result of Nietzsche’s influence, the academic philosophy of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries became a “philosophy of value” and “phenomenology of value.” Values themselves appeared to be things in themselves, which one might arrange into “systems.” Although tacitly rejecting Nietzsche’s philosophy, one rummaged through Nietzsche’s writings, especially Zarathustra, for such values. Then, “more scientifically” than the “unscientific philosopher-poet” Nietzsche, one organized them into an “ethics of value”.
When we discuss valuative thought in this lecture course, we are referring exclusively to Nietzsche’s metaphysics. Around the turn of the century, one branch of neo-Kantianism, associated with the names Windelband and Rickert, described itself as “philosophy of value” in a rather narrow and academic sense. The lasting service of the movement is not its “philosophy of value” but its attitude — remarkable for its time — which preserved and handed down a trace of authentic knowledge about the essence of philosophy and philosophical inquiry against the onslaught of scientific “psychology” and “biology,” supposedly the only valid “philosophies.” But this stance, which was “traditional” in a good sense, nonetheless prevented the “philosophy of value” from thinking through valuative thought in its metaphysical essence; that is, prevented the movement from really taking nihilism seriously. The movement believed it could elude nihilism by means of a return to Kantian philosophy, but this return was merely a retreat before nihlism and a refusal to look into the abyss it covers.
Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. 4 “European Nihilism”, pp. 59-60, trans. David Farell Krell
In other words, a focus on “human values” as the foundation of metaphysics is the purest nihilism: they are defined in opposition to what merely is, and if they are its fundament than what merely is is not. For an alternative, consider a reading of Nietzschean elements in Sein und Zeit: following on from his early work, in that book Heidegger took a special interest in the problematic of die Welt, “the world”. According to Heidegger, the world is what we encounter all entities within, and through this commerce Dasein is revealed to itself.
I think a useful and entertaining way for the American to think about Heidegger’s Welt is through a consideration of the sport of football, and metaphors derived thereof. Deriving from rugby, football is about physical and organizational perfection: only the strongest and fittest men get to play football, and they must work together flawlessly. [NB: although I will leave the history and theory of "The Bus" to another, let me suggest that Flavor Flav's comment re: the Super Bowl "We got a black quarterback, so step back" is both an expression of black pride and an implicit critique.]
Do sporting Americans like football? Well, not really: the action eats the players up worse than owner games, and you know, some of us are not totally without ressentiment. However, the reality of football is that it expresses the imperatives of American corporate life: from the steel-industry logo to New York’s fabled Meadowlands, football expresses the best in American life because it’s kind of got to be that way. The connection to Heidegger? Well, he presumably was not without a certain amount of skepticism regarding the motives of German corporations, but if there is a “critical-theoretic” point to be wrested from Division I, Chapter III it is that die Welt, the sharpness and definition of our individuation of “objects” all kinds comes into existence through an agency other than our own: and if it becomes too much at some point, perhaps there is some use for nihilistic “revaluation”.